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GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS REVIEW: ARE THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT’S
DECISIONS CONSISTENT WITH IHL INTERNMENT STANDARDS?
Laura M. Olson*
After the Supreme Court ruled in 2008 in Boumediene v. Bush that the de-
tainees at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility are entitled to the privi-
lege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention, the D.C. 
District Court started to take action on the hundreds of petitions filed. In 
these habeas proceedings, the court has faced the threshold legal question 
of the scope of the government’s authority to detain pursuant to the Autho-
rization for Use of Military Force as informed by the law of war. This ar-
ticle reviews how the court has delimited the permissible bounds of the gov-
ernment’s detention authority, specifically focusing on whether the court’s 
decisions are consistent with the internment standards under the law of war, 
international humanitarian law (IHL). This analysis seeks to assess whether 
the court’s application of the Bush Administration’s definition of “enemy 
combatant” or the new definition provided by the Obama Administration is 
broader or narrower than the IHL standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that statutory habeas 
jurisdiction extended to Guantánamo,1 those detained at the Guantánamo
Bay detention facility filed hundreds of petitions. No action, however, was 
taken on the petitions until the Supreme Court ruled in 2008 in Boumediene 
v. Bush that Guantánamo detainees are “entitled to the privilege of habeas 
corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”2 As of this writing, the 
D.C. District Court has ruled on thirty-five petitions, granting twenty-nine, 
under both the Bush and Obama Administrations.3
* Laura M. Olson, J.D., LL.M., is Senior Counsel at the Constitution Project and Presi-
dent of Blackletter Consulting, LLC. She previously served for ten years as legal advisor to 
the ICRC. The views expressed in this article reflect those of the author and not necessarily 
those of the Constitution Project or of Blackletter Consulting, LLC.
1 See 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2006)).
2 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
3 See Carol Rosenberg, Judge Orders Release of Yemeni From Guantánamo, MIAMI 
HERALD, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/
guantanamo/story/1191864.html (reporting that “Kessler’s ruling raised to 29 the number of 
long-held Guantánamo captives that federal judges have ordered released . . . compared with 
the six whose detentions that judges have upheld.”). An additional petition was denied just as 
this article was submitted, thus, that case is not included in this analysis: Al Odah, et al. v. 
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In these habeas proceedings, the D.C. District Court has faced the 
threshold legal question: “what is the scope of the government’s authority to 
detain these, and other, detainees pursuant to the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force . . . , as informed by the law of war?”4 This article reviews 
how the District Court has delimited “‘[t]he permissible bounds’ of the gov-
ernment’s detention authority ‘as subsequent cases are presented to them.’”5
Specifically, the focus is on whether the D.C. District Court’s decisions are 
consistent with the internment standards under the law of war, international 
humanitarian law (IHL). As internment,6
The applicable conventional IHL rules vary depending upon wheth-
er an armed conflict is international or non-international. There exist fewer 
rules applicable to non-international armed conflict and, in contrast to IHL 
applicable to international armed conflict, there are no conventional IHL 
rules providing a basis for internment in non-international armed conflicts. 
The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld concluded that, at the very 
least, Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions applies to the U.S. 
conflict with al-Qaeda because it is a “conflict not of an international cha-
racter.”
the deprivation of a person’s liber-
ty without criminal charge as a preventive security measure, is an extreme 
measure even in armed conflict, IHL set limits on its use. This analysis 
seeks to assess whether application by the D.C. District Court of the Bush 
Administration’s definition of “enemy combatant” or the new definition 
provided by the Obama Administration is broader or narrower than the IHL 
standards.
7
United States et al., Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2730489, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 
24, 2009) (denying Al Odah’s petition—the oldest of the pending Guantánamo Bay habeas 
cases).
Many of the individuals currently held at Guantánamo were de-
4 Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.D.C. 2009).
5 Id. at 66 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004)).
6 In this article, the term “internment” and occasionally the more general term “detention”
will be used to refer to preventive detention without charge or what is also called security or 
administration detention.
7 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–31 (2006) (citing Article 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions, see First Geneva Convention, infra note 10, art. 3) (emphasis 
added). The armed conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates how conflicts can evolve. It is gen-
erally agreed that an international armed conflict in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001 
between U.S. and coalition forces and the Taliban and its allied forces (i.e., al-Qaeda). While 
it has not always been agreed, experts have contended that this international armed conflict 
ended on June 19, 2002 (with the convening of the Loya Jirga that established the Interim 
Government of Afghanistan). See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for 
International Law?, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 71, 76–77 (2004). After June 19, 2002, the con-
flict then transformed into a non-international armed conflict, internationalized by the pres-
ence of the United States and coalition forces, between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and Afgha-
nistan (supported by the United States and coalition forces). Id. at 82. The United States has 
claimed that an armed conflict has been ongoing prior to September 11, 2001—since the 
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tained in relation to that conflict. Thus, much of the discussion on intern-
ment in this article concerns the extent to which analogous application of 
IHL internment standards applicable to international armed conflict is ap-
propriate in non-international armed conflict and, if so, in which form.8
The first section of this article provides background by briefly de-
scribing the bases for internment under conventional IHL and explaining 
how IHL of international armed conflict could be analogously applied to 
non-international armed conflicts in order to address internment. The fol-
lowing section discusses the executive branch’s practice of internment at 
Guantánamo, assessing both the asserted legal bases for internment and the 
various internment standards in relation to IHL. The third section reviews 
the D.C. District Court’s interpretation of the executive’s internment stan-
dards to see if the court’s decisions are consistent with IHL internment 
standards. This review and accompanying analysis modestly seeks to 
present some initial reflections on these issues and by no means intends to 
be exhaustive.
II. INTERNMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT UNDER IHL
In peacetime, as during armed conflict, persons may be detained 
awaiting trial for a crime or based upon conviction for a crime. For the indi-
vidual non-state actor, participation in the conflict generally constitutes a 
crime under the domestic law of the state affected by the conflict. This sec-
bombings of the U.S. embassies (August 7, 1998) in the East African capital cities of Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya and the U.S.S. Cole (October 12, 2000) in Yemen.
The Supreme Court in Hamdan did not question the U.S. assertion that an armed conflict 
with al-Qaeda began on September 11, 2001, however, the Court did not assert that it began
prior to that date. Without explicitly stating the classification of the conflict, the Court found 
that Common Article 3 applied. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–31. The Court rejected the Bush 
Administration’s argument that the conflict with al-Qaeda was an international armed con-
flict based on the reasoning that an international armed conflict can only be between states.
Id. But see First Additional Protocol, infra note 27, art. 1(4). The Supreme Court also re-
jected the argument that a non-international armed conflict can only occur within the territo-
ry of a single state. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631. Thus, the Court appears to have concluded that 
the conflict with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is a non-international armed conflict as understood 
for application of Common Article 3.
8 “According to the government, then, because the law of war has evolved primarily in 
the context of international armed conflicts between nations, the President has the authority 
to detain ‘those persons whose relationship to al-Qaida or the Taliban would, in appropriately 
analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, render them detaina-
ble.’” Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009) (citing Respon-
dents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees 
Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442
(TFH) (D.C. Cir. March 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
memo-re-det-auth.pdf [hereinafter March 13 Memo]).
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tion focuses on that which is more unique to armed conflicts—internment of 
enemies without criminal charge as a preventive security measure, specifi-
cally the internment of prisoners of war and, under certain circumstances,
civilians. This section describes the possible bases under IHL for this par-
ticular form of deprivation of liberty in international and non-international 
armed conflict.
A. IHL Bases for Internment: When to Hold and When to Release9
IHL provides grounds for possible internment in international 
armed conflict under certain conditions for specific categories of protected 
persons. The First and Second Geneva Conventions regulate the retention of 
medical and religious personnel “only in so far as the state of health, the 
spiritual needs and the number of prisoners of war require.”10 The Third 
Geneva Convention stipulates that “[t]he Detaining Power may subject pris-
oners of war to internment.”11 Concerning civilians, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention provides that—as to aliens in the territory of a party to the con-
flict—“[t]he internment or placing in assigned residence of protected per-
sons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it 
absolutely necessary.”12
9 Material for this section has been substantially based on text written by this author. See
Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between Inter-
national Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the Procedural Regula-
tion of Internment in Non-international Armed Conflict. 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 437, 
439–42 (2009); Marco Sassòli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment 
of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599, 617–18
(2008).
In an occupied territory, “[i]f the Occupying Power 
considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety 
10 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 28, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
First Geneva Convention]; see also id. arts. 30, 32; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
arts. 36–37, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva 
Convention].
11 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 21, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. Article 4 of 
the Third Geneva Convention defines prisoner of war. Prisoners of war are not limited to 
members of the armed force but also include, for example, “[p]ersons accompanying the 
armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military 
aircraft crews, war correspondents, and supply contractors.” Id. art. 4(A)(4) (emphasis 
added).
12 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] 
(emphasis added).
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measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to 
assigned residence or to internment.”13
In contrast, conventional IHL applicable to non-international armed 
conflict provides no specific grounds for internment. Yet, conventional IHL 
contemplates that internment occurs in non-international armed conflict, as 
demonstrated by the references to internment found in Articles 5 and 6 of 
the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions,14
In order to explain the absence of a legal basis for internment in 
IHL applicable to non-international armed conflict, a parallel will be drawn 
to the issue of the legality of non-state actors taking up arms against the 
state—that is, engaging in armed conflict. This is not a matter regulated by 
IHL, but by domestic law,
which regu-
late—to a certain extent—internment. Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions makes no reference to internment. 
15 and it is hard to imagine domestic legislation 
doing anything but prohibiting such action.16 Thus, while a non-state actor 
by the mere fact of engaging in armed conflict violates domestic law, it does 
not violate IHL. IHL addresses the reality that non-international armed con-
flict exists—and that internment will occur during it—“by regulating it to 
ensure a minimum of humanity in this . . . illegal situation.”17
In addition to providing guidance on when internment may occur or 
begin, IHL applicable to international armed conflict also stipulates when 
the captivity must end—further clarifying the boundaries of permissible 
internment. Retention of medical and religious personnel must cease if pris-
oners of war are not in need.18 According to the Third Geneva Convention, 
repatriation of prisoners of war takes place due to medical reasons during
the conflict,19
13 Id. art. 78 (emphasis added).
and release and repatriation for all, without delay, must occur 
14 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 5, adopted June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612 (providing that “the following provisions shall be respected as 
a minimum with regard to persons deprived of liberty for reasons related to the armed con-
flict, whether they are interned or detained . . . .”) [hereinafter Second Additional Protocol].
15 The use of force between states (international armed conflict) is a matter regulated by 
international law, i.e., jus ad bellum (distinct from jus in bello).
16 This explains the incorporation of Article 6(5) into the Second Additional Protocol. See
Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 6(5) (stating that at the end of hostilities 
authorities should grant broad amnesty to armed conflict participants and those deprived of 
liberty in relation to the armed conflict). Without amnesty, non-state actors may be reluctant 
to put down their arms because they likely violated domestic criminal law by their participa-
tion in hostilities.
17 MARCO SASSÒLI ET AL., 1 HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 102–03 (2006).
18 See First Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 28; Second Geneva Convention, supra 
note 10, art. 37.
19 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 109–17. 
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after the cessation of active hostilities.20 Unlike prisoners of war (with no 
medical reason requiring release), civilian internees may not necessarily be 
interned until the end of the conflict. The Fourth Geneva Convention pro-
vides that a civilian must be released “as soon as the reasons which necessi-
tated his internment no longer exist”;21 this may be during the conflict. If, 
however, civilians remain interned for the duration of the conflict, 
“[i]nternment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.”22
Captured combatants, simply because they are opposing comba-
tants, are interned in order to prevent them from returning to the battlefield. 
Except when doubt arises as to whether the person is entitled to prisoner-of-
war status,23 there is no need for an individual review, as the internment is 
not based on any particular individual characteristic but on mere formal 
membership in the state’s armed forces (or formally accompanying the 
armed forces) and would run counter to the IHL objective for interning of 
prisoners of war.24
Thus, generally only the basis for interning a civilian requires an as-
sessment,
As the reasoning behind the basis for internment of pris-
oners of war under IHL is unique, the reasoning does not extend to interned 
civilians in an international armed conflict or persons interned in a non-
international armed conflict.
25 as civilians—unlike combatants who are captured and become 
prisoners of war—may only be interned if and for as long as they pose an 
imperative security threat. The Fourth Geneva Convention applicable to 
international armed conflicts provides internment review procedures appli-
cable to civilian internees, giving some detail regarding the type of body 
and timing of review. 26 The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Con-
ventions introduces an additional safeguard to the process.27
20 Id. art. 118; But see id. art. 119(5).
Finally, it 
21 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 132.
22 Id. art. 133. 
23 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 5.
24 See Marco Sassòli, Le Droit International Humanitaire, Une Lex Specialis par Rapport 
aux Droit Humains?, in LE DROITS DE L’HOMME ET LA CONSTITUTION, ETUDES EN 
L’HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR GIORGIO MALINVERNI 375, 386–87 (2007). See SASSÒLI ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 154–55. See also Gloria Gaggioli and Robert Kolb, A Right to Life in 
Armed Conflicts? The Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights, 37 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 115, 122 (2007) (Thus, this “gap” in IHL is instead an intentional omission, a 
“qualified silence”).
25 Reviews of medical reasons for the release of prisoners of war also take place. See Third 
Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 109–17. 
26 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 43, 78(2).
27 The person interned is to “be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the 
reasons why these measures were taken.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
art. 75(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol]. 
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should be noted that unlawful confinement is a grave breach of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.28
The Second Additional Protocol applicable in non-international 
armed conflict briefly mentions internment29
B. Internment of Civilians During International Armed Conflict: The 
Meaning of “Imperative Reasons of Security”
but provides no guidance re-
garding procedures either to assess the decision to intern or to terminate 
captivity. Again, Common Article 3 does not speak to the issue.
A civilian may be interned based on an individual determination 
that it is absolutely necessary for “imperative reasons of security”—rather 
than on mere formal membership in the state’s armed forces as for prisoners 
of war. Thus, understanding the meaning and scope of “imperative reasons 
of security” is critical to appropriately applying IHL and ensuring no arbi-
trary deprivation of liberty takes place.
As the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) stated, “[t]he confinement of civilians during armed conflict may be 
permissible in limited cases, but has in any event to be in compliance with 
the provisions of . . . Geneva Convention IV.”30 In that regard, it is crucial 
to understand what is meant by the following language in the Fourth Gene-
va Convention, which stipulates the legal basis for internment: “if the secu-
rity of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary”31 or, in occupied 
territory, “imperative reasons of security”.32
This legal basis requires that, for purposes of internment, persons 
must represent a real threat to the state’s security in the present or in the 
future. The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention explains “[i]t 
did not seem possible to define the expression ‘security of the State’ in a 
more concrete fashion. It is thus left very largely to Governments to decide 
the measure of activity prejudicial to the internal or external security of the 
28 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 147. See also Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(vii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 2(g), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M 
1192.
29 The Second Additional Protocol only states that “[i]f it is decided to release persons 
deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so 
deciding.” Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 5(4). In the Second Additional 
Protocol’s suggestion to grant amnesty for participation in hostilities, internment is men-
tioned: “[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned
or detained.” Id. art. 6(5) (emphasis added). 
30 

	-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 578 (Nov. 16, 1998).
31 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 42 (emphasis added).
32 Id. art. 78 (emphasis added).
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State which justifies internment or assigned residence.”33 The ICTY agrees 
with the assertion that “the decision of whether a civilian constitutes a threat 
to the security of the State is largely left to its discretion”;34
In the  case, the ICTY found the accused guilty of unlawful 
confinement of civilians—grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion.
however, this 
does not mean that no parameters exist on this discretion.
35 The ICTY “interpreted Article 42 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention] 
as permitting internment only if there are ‘serious and legitimate reasons’ to 
think that the interned persons may seriously prejudice the security of the 
detaining power by means such as sabotage or espionage.”36
Clearly, internment is only permitted when absolutely necessary. Subver-
sive activity carried on inside the territory of a party to the conflict, or ac-
tions which are of direct assistance to an opposing party, may threaten the 
security of the former, which may, therefore, intern people or place them 
in assigned residence if it has serious and legitimate reasons to think that 
they may seriously prejudice its security by means such as sabotage or 
espionage.
The ICTY Tri-
al Chamber held:
On the other hand, the mere fact that a person is a national of, or aligned 
with, an enemy party cannot be considered as threatening the security of 
the opposing party where he is living and is not, therefore, a valid reason 
for interning him or placing him in assigned residence. To justify recourse 
to such measures, the party must have good reason to think that the person 
concerned, by his activities, knowledge or qualifications, represents a real 
threat to its present or future security.37
The Trial Chamber also stated:
The judicial or administrative body reviewing the decision of a party to a 
conflict to detain an individual must bear in mind that such measures of 
detention should only be taken if absolutely necessary for reasons of secu-
rity. Thus, if these measures were inspired by other considerations, the re-
33 4 COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN 
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 257 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) (regarding Article 42); see also id. at 
368 (regarding Article 78 and reiterating that “[i]n any case, such measures can only be 
ordered for real and imperative reasons of security; their exceptional character must be pre-
served.”) [hereinafter COMMENTARY].
34 

	-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 583 (Nov. 16, 1998). See also

	-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 282–85 (Feb.26, 2001).
35 	
, IT-96-21-T, at Part IV.
36 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 345 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (citing , IT-96-21-T, ¶ 576). See also id. ¶ 582 
(referencing Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva, applicable to occupied territory, as also safe-
guarding the rights of interned persons).
37 Pro

	-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 576–77 (Nov. 16, 1998) (em-
phasis in original).
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viewing body would be bound to vacate them. Clearly, the procedures es-
tablished in Geneva Convention IV itself are a minimum and the funda-
mental consideration must be that no civilian should be kept in assigned 
residence or in an internment camp for a longer time than the security of 
the detaining party absolutely demands.38
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)39 and the 
ICTY agree that “it must be borne in mind that the measure of internment 
for reasons of security is an exceptional one and can never be taken on a 
collective basis”,40 i.e., that there must be an individual nexus.41 The ICRC 
asserts “that internment . . . for the sole purpose of intelligence gathering, 
without the person involved otherwise presenting a real threat to State secu-
rity, cannot be justified.”42 The U.S. Supreme Court agrees; a plurality of 
the Court interpreted the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) as implicitly including the power to detain, under certain circums-
tances, al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured in Afghanistan. However, 
the Court noted that “[c]ertainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the 
purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”43
38 Id. ¶ 581.
The ICRC also points out that 
39 ICRC institutional guidelines: “Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Intern-
ment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence”,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED 
CONFLICTS 11, 30IC/07/8.4 (Oct. 2007), Annex 1 (originally published as Jelena Pejic, Pro-
cedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Con-
flict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375, 381 (2005), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-858-p375/$File/irrc_858_Pejic.
pdf) [hereinafter ICRC Guidelines].
40 Prosecutor v. Delai
	-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 583 (Nov. 16, 1998). See also

	-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 285 (Feb.26, 2001).
41 See COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 367 (regarding Article 78 and stating that “there 
can be no question of taking collective measures: each case must be decided separately”).
42 ICRC Guidelines, supra note 39, at 380.
43 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality). See Matthew Waxman, Admin-
istrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L &
POL’Y 1, 15–16 (2009) (citations omitted):
[N]o doubt information-gathering was at the forefront of the Bush administration’s 
detention policies, as demonstrated by the lengths to which that Administration 
went to defend permissive interrogation standards and CIA detention programs. 
“These are dangerous men with unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks 
and their plans for new attacks,” explained President Bush in September 2006, in 
disclosing publicly the CIA secret detention program. “The security of our nation 
and the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what those terrorists 
know.” 
Id. at 16 (citing President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Com-
missions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/. See also Remarks by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, 
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“interning or administratively detaining persons for the purpose of using 
them as ‘bargaining chips’ is also not justifiable as a reason for internment. 
Such deprivation of liberty would in fact amount to hostage-taking, which is 
prohibited.”44
“Subversive activity carried on inside the territory of a Party to the 
conflict or actions which are of direct assistance to an enemy Power”45
meets the threshold of “imperative reasons of security”.46 Providing logis-
tical support, analogous to that described in the Third Geneva Convention47
Furthermore, given the discussion below on U.S. internment stan-
dards, it is important to emphasize that this standard of “imperative reasons 
of security” is distinct from that of “direct participation in hostilities.”
for persons “accompanying” the armed forces rather than being part of 
them, can be considered direct assistance. Merely having political sympathy 
or political affiliation with the enemy cannot constitute “imperative reasons 
of security” for internment purposes.
48
Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search (July 21, 2008) (“Detention often yields valuable intelligence about the intentions, 
organization, operations, and tactics of our enemy.”)). See also DEP’T OF ARMY,
COUNTERINSURGENCY (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
In COIN environments, distinguishing an insurgent from a civilian is difficult and 
often impossible. Treating a civilian like an insurgent, however, is a sure recipe for 
failure. Individuals suspected of insurgent or terrorist activity may be detained for 
two reasons: 
 To prevent them from conducting further attacks. 
 To gather information to prevent other insurgents and terrorists from conduct-
ing attacks.
These reasons allow for two classes of persons to be detained and interrogated: 
 Persons who have engaged in, or assisted those who engage in, terrorist or 
insurgent activities. 
 Persons who have incidentally obtained knowledge regarding insurgent and 
terrorist activity, but who are not guilty of associating with such groups.
People engaging in insurgent activities may be detained as enemies. Persons not 
guilty of associating with insurgent or terrorist groups may be detained and ques-
tioned for specific information. However, since these people have not—by virtue 
of their activities—represented a threat, they may be detained only long enough to 
obtain the relevant information. Since persons in the second category have not en-
gaged in criminal or insurgent activities, they must be released, even if they refuse 
to provide information.
Id. ¶ 7-40.
44 ICRC Guidelines, supra note 39, at 380 n.20. 
45 See COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 258 (regarding Article 42).
46 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 78.
47 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4).
48 See generally Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J.
INT’L L. 48 (2009) (addressing the improper conflation between the authority to target and 
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First, these standards serve different purposes. The latter determines 
whether a civilian loses his or her presumptive49 immunity from attack and
may thus be directly targeted during that period50
the authority to intern, particularly the distinction between civilians “directly participating in 
hostilities” and civilians not having done so but yet posing an imperative security threat).
and the former determines 
whether a civilian during an international armed conflict may be interned. 
Second, their scopes of coverage differ. While the standard of “direct par-
ticipation in hostilities” can—in rough terms—be considered an authoriza-
tion to kill, the standard of “imperative reasons of security” merely initiates 
a temporary deprivation of a person’s liberty; the latter standard is broader 
in scope. There is overlap only in that a civilian “directly participating in 
hostilities” would certainly meet the standard of “imperative reasons of se-
curity” for purposes of internment; the reverse is not automatically true.
49 “In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civi-
lian.” First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 50(1).
50 Despite mention of the standard of “direct participation in hostilities” in IHL treaty law, 
applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts, no definition of it exists in 
treaty law, state practice, or jurisprudence. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 10, 
art. 3 (also known as “Common Article 3”); Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 
13; First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 51(3). The Israeli Supreme Court is the only 
court to have addressed this notion in some detail. See Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. 
Gov’t of Isr., HCJ 769/02 (Dec. 14, 2006). Lack of criteria to distinguish between peaceful 
civilians who cannot be directly attacked and civilians “directly participating in hostilities” 
who may be attacked for such time as that they directly participate in hostilities led the ICRC
to engage a process, involving experts, to clarify the notion of “direct participation in hostili-
ties” under IHL. The importance of this clarification has dramatically increased in parallel 
with the growing involvement of civilians in the conduct of hostilities in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts. The outcome of this process was released in the form 
of “interpretative guidance” in mid-2009. NILS MELZER, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE 
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW (May 2009), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/SODA-7TJP5H/
$file/ICRC_002_0990.pdf?openelement [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].
In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet the 
following cumulative criteria: 1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the mili-
tary operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, 
to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct 
attack (threshold of harm), and 2. there must be a direct causal link between the act 
and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military op-
eration of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 3. the 
act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm 
in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent 
nexus).
Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).
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C. What To Do During Non-International Armed Conflicts Where IHL 
Provides No Basis for Internment?51
In response to the fact that IHL of non-international armed conflict 
(such as currently taking place in Afghanistan52) only indicates that intern-
ment occurs in non-international conflicts but contains no indication of how 
it is to be regulated,53
As mentioned, the provisions regulating internment in international 
armed conflict, unlike for non-international armed conflict, are set out ac-
cording to protected person categories—for example, prisoners of war or 
civilians. However, this does not prevent application of those provisions to 
non-international armed conflict because “no fundamental difference be-
tween the regimes applicable to the two situations prohibits the application 
of those same” provisions, as long as the rules are applied according to the 
person’s function rather than status.
the U.S. Administration and courts have applied IHL 
of international armed conflict by analogy. How they have done so is dis-
cussed in more detail later. However, this section explains in general how 
IHL of international armed conflict could be analogously applied to non-
international armed conflicts in order to address internment. The implica-
tions—both positive and negative—of doing so are also addressed. 
54 This is particularly relevant as the 
status of combatants formally exists only in international armed conflicts.55
Applied by analogy, IHL of international armed conflict would pro-
vide bases for internment. Thus, the standards of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention would apply to civilians and those of the Third Geneva Convention 
to persons designated as “combatants”.56 Whether fighters in a non-
international armed conflict can be analogized to “combatants” or remain 
civilians, who may be targeted when directly participating in hostilities, 
remains unsettled.57 However, making the distinction between “combatants” 
and civilians in non-international armed conflict would appear consistent 
with current discussions by experts on the use of the “membership ap-
proach” to interpret “direct participation in hostilities” in such conflicts.58
51 Material for this section has been substantially based on text written by this author in 
Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at 623–25.
52 See supra text accompany note 7.
53 See ICRC Guidelines, supra note 39, at 377.
54 “[T]he law of non-international armed conflict does not protect according to the status 
of a person but according to his or her actual activities.” SASSÒLI ET AL., supra note 17, at 
258.
55 “The main feature of [combatant] status in international armed conflicts is that they 
have the right to directly participate in hostilities.” Id. at 149. 
56 See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 36, at 352.
57 Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at 607–08. See also ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE,
supra note 50, at 27–30.
58 See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 25.
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The “membership approach” considers an individual who fulfills a combat 
function—a function requiring direct participation in hostilities—to be a 
“member” of an armed group, such that that individual may be directly tar-
geted until he or she disengages from that function or is placed hors de 
combat.59
As analogous application does not confer combatant status, there 
would still, for example, be no combatant immunity. The Geneva Conven-
tions, while allowing for internment, would therefore not prevent the repres-
sion of acts prohibited by domestic law. Nor would application by analogy 
of the Third Geneva Convention to members of armed forces and groups 
entitle them to any review procedure; such procedural regulation could only 
be found in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
This is analogous to being a “combatant” in an international 
armed conflict. Applying this approach to internment, the “members” of an 
armed group could be held on the same (analogous) basis as combatants 
who are interned as prisoners of war in international armed conflict.
The question arises, however, as to whether the analogous applica-
tion of the law of international armed conflicts sufficiently considers the 
fundamental distinction between that law and the law of non-international 
armed conflict—that is, that the rules applicable to international armed con-
flict generally60 apply only to protected person categories, such as prisoners 
of war or enemy civilians, and that no such categories exist in non-
international armed conflict. Even if the distinction in non-international 
armed conflict could be made by function rather than status, on which crite-
ria should the assessment of a civilian or “combatant” be based? Should 
“combatants” be measured against the criteria in Article 4 of the Third Ge-
neva Convention or Article 44 of the First Additional Protocol, or perhaps 
through the “membership approach”?61 Would Article 5-type tribunals62
If the Third Geneva Convention is applied by analogy, a participant 
in hostilities could be detained without any individual periodic review for 
the whole duration of the conflict.
need to be instituted in non-international armed conflicts to make the 
determination? 
63
59 “Civilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each specific act 
amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas members of organized armed groups 
belonging to a non-State party to an armed conflict cease to be civilians . . . , and lose protec-
tion against direct attack, for as long as they assume their continuous combat function.” Id. at 
70.
However, it is much more difficult in 
60 An exception is, for example, Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol. See First Ad-
ditional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 75.
61 See supra text accompanying note 59. 
62 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 5.
63 For a standpoint rejecting such an analogy, see Comm’n on Human Rights, Situation of 
Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, ¶ 24, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006).
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non-international conflicts than in international armed conflicts to determine 
who is actually a fighter.64 Such a determination must therefore be made on 
an individual basis. It is also much harder to determine the actual end of 
hostilities in a non-international armed conflict than in an international 
armed conflict between states, which may conclude a ceasefire or surrender. 
All this may support application, if at all, of the law of international armed 
conflict to non-international armed conflict by analogy to the Fourth Gene-
va Convention alone, as there are no combatants and hence no concomitant 
prisoner-of-war status in non-international armed conflicts. Furthermore, 
analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention could be founded on a determina-
tion of the lex specialis according to the overall systemic purposes of the 
international legal order.65 In a non-international armed conflict, analogy to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention would avoid internment of persons without 
review or possible release66 for the duration of the conflict. Application of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, brings with it an internment stan-
dard—“imperative reasons of security”—that is broader in scope than that
for determining combatancy.67
III. U.S. PRACTICE REGARDING INTERNMENT OF PERSONS HELD 
AT GUANTÁNAMO
A. U.S.-asserted Legal Bases for Internment
The Bush Administration based its authority to intern on Executive 
power and the AUMF passed by Congress on September 18, 2001.68
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of internation-
Con-
gress passed the AUMF in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, au-
thorizing the President to: 
64 See Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at 607–08, 613–16.
65 For a fuller discussion on lex specialis, see Olson, supra note 9, at 445–49; Sassòli & 
Olson, supra note 9, at 603–04. 
66 But see Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 109–17 (referring to repatriation 
of prisoners of war during the conflict for medical reasons). 
67 See id. art. 4; First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 44. See also ICRC
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 25 (the “membership approach” using direct 
participation in hostilities).
68 “The Government argues that petitioners are lawfully detained because they are ‘enemy 
combatants,’ who can be held pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force and 
the President’s powers as Commander in Chief.” Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191,
196 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008). 
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al terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons.69
An AUMF must be distinguished from a declaration of war—of 
which there have only been eleven.70 In particular, the domestic law ramifi-
cations of an AUMF differ substantially from declarations of war.71 The 
language employed in AUMFs varies—each AUMF being drafted to the 
contours of a specific situation.72 The AUMF passed by Congress in 2001 is 
quite broad. Unlike previous AUMFs, the 2001 AUMF authorizes the use of 
military force not only against states connected to the September 11, 2001 
attacks but also against organizations and persons. This extension to organi-
zations and persons is unprecedented in U.S. history.73
While the full scope of the 2001 AUMF’s reach remains to be de-
termined, it is clear that the Bush Administration interpreted this AUMF 
broadly, “confirm[ing] the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief to 
conduct antiterrorism operations anywhere in the world, including within 
the United States.”74
69 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 
18, 2001). 
The Bush Administration has cited the AUMF as au-
thorizing measures incident to “warfighting”, including internment. The 
Administration also asserted authority to conduct electronic surveillance of 
70 JENNIFER K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (March 8, 2007), available at http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf. These eleven declarations of war encompassed five different 
wars: The War of 1812 with Great Britain, the War with Mexico in 1846, the War with Spain 
in 1898, the WWI, and WWII. Id. at 1–2.
71 Elsea’s and Grimmet’s report declares:
With respect to domestic law, a declaration of war automatically triggers many 
standby statutory authorities conferring special powers on the President with re-
spect to the military, foreign trade, transportation, communications, manufacturing, 
alien enemies, etc. In contrast, no standby authorities appear to be triggered auto-
matically by an authorization for the use of force. Most standby authorities do not 
require a declaration of war to be actualized but can be triggered by a declaration 
of national emergency or simply by the existence of a state of war. Declarations of 
war and authorizations for the use of force waive the time limitations otherwise 
applicable to the use of force imposed by the War Powers Resolution.
Id. at Summary. For a list of the statutes triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of 
national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war, see id. at 45–76.
72 For the text of key AUMFs, see id. app. II.
73 Id. at 17.
74 Id. at 18.
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communications within the United States without following procedures laid 
out in the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act.75
While the Obama Administration has not asserted Executive power 
for its authority to intern but rather said it would rely on authority already 
provided by Congress through the AUMF, the Obama Administration con-
tinues to justify internment because of the existence of an armed conflict, 
stating that the AUMF is to be “informed by principle of the laws of war.”76
In fact, it appears that the Obama Administration follows the preceding 
Administration’s view that the United States is involved in a “novel” type of 
armed conflict.77
The Obama Administration’s specific reference to the law of war in 
interpreting the AUMF is a positive step in that it ensures application of 
IHL, which was not always the case during the previous Administration.78
A plurality of the Supreme Court in Hamdi determined that the use 
of force authorized by the AUMF includes the authority to intern individu-
als who are a part of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the context of an armed 
conflict: 
However, if there is no armed conflict, the AUMF must not be informed by 
IHL, but by other applicable law: international human rights law and do-
mestic law.
There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United 
States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to 
have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those at-
tacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We 
conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we 
are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they 
were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be 
75 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa11906wp.pdf.
76 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1.
77 Id.
78 “I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of 
the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere 
throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party 
to Geneva.” Memorandum from President George W. Bush to National Security Advisors, 
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, ¶ 2(a) (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. “I also accept the 
legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Gene-
va does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the 
relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to ‘armed 
conflict not of an international character.’” Id. at 2(c).
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an exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has autho-
rized the President to use.79
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Hamdi specifically focuses on armed 
conflict:
In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use 
specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant’s
return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permit-
ting the use of “necessary and appropriate force,” Congress has clearly and 
unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered 
here.80
The Court did not address specifically whether the AUMF provides 
the basis to intern “non-combatants” or whether the AUMF provides the 
basis to intern in situations not rising to the level of armed conflict. These 
issues remain to be explicitly addressed. However, following the Court’s 
reasoning, the identical conclusion could be reached for “peacetime” opera-
tions, i.e., law enforcement operations: If detention “is so fundamental and 
accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and ap-
propriate force’”,81
District Court Judge Ellen Huvelle’s recent opinion indicated a li-
mitation on the Executive’s authority to intern. She wrote “the AUMF, 
which defines the Executive’s detention authority in plain and unambiguous 
language, speaks only to the prevention of ‘future acts of international ter-
rorism against the United States.’”
then certainly detention should also be similarly consi-
dered in law enforcement operations where permissible use of deadly force 
is much more circumscribed than is its use by and against combatants in an 
armed conflict.
82
[The AUMF] does not authorize unlimited, unreviewable detention. In-
stead, the AUMF requires some nexus between the force (i.e., detention) 
and its purpose (i.e., preventing individuals from rejoining the enemy to 
commit hostile acts). Accordingly, the AUMF does not authorize detention 
of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent those individuals 
While prevention of future acts could 
be interpreted quite broadly, Judge Huvelle points out that:
79 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (emphasis added) (plurality).
80 Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 518.
82 Basardh v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 8 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), avail-
able at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136 (emphasis 
added) (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 
224 (Sept. 18, 2001)).
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from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize deten-
tion where its purpose can no longer be attained.83
B. The Initial U.S. Standard(s) for Internment: Creation of the “(Un-
lawful) Enemy Combatant” Category
This section looks at the internment standards employed by the
United States and compares them to the IHL internment standards, thus 
providing the background necessary for discussion of the D.C. District 
Court’s application of these standards that follows. First, the various defini-
tions of “unlawful enemy combatant” employed under the Bush Administra-
tion are discussed. After which, the new standard provided by the Obama 
Administration will be compared and contrasted to IHL internment stan-
dards as well as the Bush Administration’s definitions.
1. U.S. definitions of “enemy combatant” and “unlawful enemy 
combatant”
Through the use of the definitions “enemy combatant” and “unlaw-
ful enemy combatant”, the United States has created a category of persons 
not found in IHL, resulting in unfortunate consequences for the protective 
features of IHL. The Bush Administration84
In Hamdi, the U.S. Government offered a definition of “enemy 
combatant” that more closely tracked the “direct participation in hostilities” 
standard than would subsequent definitions: “an individual who . . . was 
‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States and its coalition 
partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the 
and Congress have over time 
utilized various definitions of “enemy combatant”. 
83 Basardh, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 8.
84 The Military Order in 2001 gave a first indication of whom the U.S. planned to intern:
[A]ny individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I deter-
mine from time to time in writing that: (1) there is reason to believe that such indi-
vidual, at the relevant times, (i) is or was a member of the organization known as al 
Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of inter-
national terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to 
cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United 
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has kno-
wingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of 
subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and (2) it is in the interest of the United States that 
such individual be subject to this order.
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, at 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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United States’ there.”85 As mentioned above, the standard of “direct partici-
pation in hostilities” in IHL is not an internment standard; rather, it deter-
mines when a civilian loses his or her protection against direct attack.86
After Hamdi, the Order Establishing the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (CSRTs) broadened the definition of “enemy combatant”. The 
Order provided that an “enemy combatant” is:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, 
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States 
or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a 
belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed 
forces. 87
According to this definition, anyone who merely supports the Tali-
ban or al-Qaeda is deemed a “combatant”. However, mere support of the 
war effort does not constitute combatancy.88
85 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Brief for the 
Respondents at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.
org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs_03/03-6696Resp.pdf). 
The concern with this standard 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 48–50 (regarding direct participation in hostilities) 
and 56–59 (regarding analogous application).
87 Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Navy, Or-
der Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, at 1 (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter July 7 Memo].
88 The ICRC Interpretive Guidance provides:
The treaty terminology of taking a “direct” part in hostilities, which describes civi-
lian conduct entailing loss of protection against direct attack, implies that there can 
also be “indirect” participation in hostilities, which does not lead to such loss of 
protection. Indeed, the distinction between a person’s direct and indirect participa-
tion in hostilities corresponds, at the collective level of the opposing parties to 
an armed conflict, to that between the conduct of hostilities and other activities that 
are part of the general war effort or may be characterized as war-sustaining 
activities.
Generally speaking, beyond the actual conduct of hostilities, the general war effort 
could be said to include all activities objectively contributing to the military defeat 
of the adversary (e.g. design, production and shipment of weapons and military 
equipment, construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and 
other infrastructure outside the context of concrete military operations), while war-
sustaining activities would additionally include political, economic or media activi-
ties supporting the general war effort (e.g. political propaganda, financial transac-
tions, production of agricultural or non-military industrial goods).
Admittedly, both the general war effort and war-sustaining activities may ultimate-
ly result in harm reaching the threshold required for a qualification as direct partic-
ipation in hostilities. Some of these activities may even be indispensable to harm-
ing the adversary, such as providing finances, food and shelter to the armed forces 
and producing weapons and ammunition. However, unlike the conduct of hostili-
ties, which is designed to cause—i.e. bring about the materialization of—the re-
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is that it establishes “guilt” by association, that is simply being a group 
member—regardless of one’s contribution—makes one an “enemy 
combatant”.
Through the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Congress 
endorsed the Administration’s CSRT definition,89
[A] person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and ma-
terially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents 
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of 
the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or a person who . . . has been 
determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the au-
thority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
as well as added a defini-
tion of “unlawful enemy combatant”. Some differences exist between these 
definitions. The MCA defines “unlawful enemy combatant” as follows:
90
Like the CSRT definition, this definition includes as “combatants” 
persons who have only supported, but not directly participated in hostilities. 
However, the MCA definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” may be 
somewhat narrower than the CSRT definition of “enemy combatant”. For 
example, the U.S. Government had acknowledged that the CSRT definition 
of “enemy combatant” might include a “little old lady in Switzerland” send-
ing money to support a charity which, unbeknownst to her, turned out to be 
a front for al-Qaeda.91 Such a person would appear to fall outside the MCA 
definition, as the person must have “purposefully and materially supported 
hostilities.”92
2. Why the “category” of “(unlawful) enemy combatant” is 
problematic from an IHL perspective
Nevertheless, even the inclusion of “hostilities” in relation to 
“support” does not prevent this definition from being applied over broad-
ly—possibly extending outside the scope of armed conflict. 
As discussed above, the rules of IHL of non-international armed 
conflict are less elaborate than those applicable to international armed con-
flict. Thus, it may be appropriate to analogize to IHL of international armed 
quired harm, the general war effort and war sustaining activities also include ac-
tivities that merely maintain or build up the capacity to cause such harm.
ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 51–52 (citations omitted).
89 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(ii) (2006).
90 Id. § 948a(1)(i). 
91 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005). The 
Government backed off this extreme view. See Al Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 226 
(4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring). 
92 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(i) (2006).
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conflict.93 Here, with respect to internment, analogy to the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions or only to the Fourth Geneva Convention could be 
appropriate. It would be inappropriate, however, given the ramifications, to 
analogize merely to the Third Geneva Convention, if such analogy merges 
“fighters” and “civilians” into that single category. This, however, is what 
the U.S. “(unlawful) enemy combatant” category effectively does.94
The U.S. category inappropriately merges the concept of “comba-
tants” and civilians who pose an imperative threat to security because the 
definition of “enemy combatant” is broader than the corresponding defini-
tion of prisoner of war found in the Third Geneva Convention.95 The U.S. 
category adds elements of the “imperative-reasons-of-security” standard for 
interning civilians during international armed conflict with some elements 
possibly even sweeping broader than that standard.96 This designation of 
“enemy combatant” is particularly dangerous for the protection of persons 
in armed conflict as it confuses the authority to intern with the authority to 
kill. In creation of this designation, it appears that the United States has ana-
logized solely to the Third Geneva Convention—and expanded its personal 
scope of application. Thus, if a person is determined to be an “enemy com-
batant” this would not only mean that the person may be interned as a pris-
oner of war for the duration of hostilities without periodic review, but may 
also be directly targeted as a combatant (and tried by a military court97 as 
demonstrated by the MCA98
93 See supra text accompanying notes 51–67.
). 
94 The statements coming from the Government referred simply to combatants. 
Because the United States [is] in an armed conflict with al Qaida and the Taliban, it 
[is] proper for the United States and its allies to detain individuals who [are] fight-
ing in that conflict. One of the most basic precepts in the law of armed conflict is 
that states may detain enemy combatants until the cessation of hostilities.
John B. Bellinger, Address at the London School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on 
Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98861.htm.
95 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4. Article 44 of the First Additional 
Protocol is not referenced here as the United States is not a party to that treaty and that ar-
ticle’s content is not generally considered customary. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 36, at 387–89; Jean Marie Henckaerts, Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: A Response to US Comments, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 473, 481 
(2007). See also SASSÒLI ET AL., supra note 17, at 149–50 (providing an outline of who is a 
combatant).
96 Its application also extends potentially beyond association with any armed conflict to 
police enforcement operations.
97 The Third Geneva Convention states that prisoners of war are to be tried by “the same 
courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the 
Detaining Power . . . .” Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 102. See also id. art. 
84.
98 It has been asserted that the definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” in the MCA is 
solely for the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction for the military commissions. 
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This new definition of “enemy combatant” also affects the treat-
ment to which individuals are entitled once captured. The incorporation of 
the notion of “unlawful enemy combatant” in, for example, the revised Ar-
my Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations, FM 2-22.3 
(FM 34-52) confusingly overlaps with other “protected person catego-
ries.”99 According to the Field Manual, only “unlawful enemy combatants” 
may be subjected to the restricted interrogation technique of “separation”.100
Finally, application of such a category to members of terrorist or-
ganizations that generally attempt to hide their identities and blend into the 
civilian population will be extremely difficult. This raises the chances 
of misidentifying an individual as an “enemy combatant” with all its 
ramifications.101
C. The Obama Administration’s Internment Standard for Those Held 
at Guantánamo: Denouncing the “Enemy Combatant” Category?
While the new Administration has abandoned the term “enemy 
combatant”, it remains to be seen whether it has actually abandoned the 
category. The specific purpose for the definition provided in the Govern-
ment’s memorandum filed on March 13, 2009102 may indicate that criticism 
that the Administration’s definition is “really a case of old wine in new bot-
tles”103
However, other sections of the MCA regarding detention refer to the statute’s definition. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). See also Goodman, supra note 48, at 61 n.68.
is premature.
99 The Army Field Manual states:
Unlawful enemy combatants: Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled 
to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coali-
tion partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. 
For  purposes of the war on terrorism, the term “unlawful enemy combatant” is de-
fined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or sup-
porting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostili-
ties against the United States or its coalition partners.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3
(FM 34-52), ¶ 6-18 (2006), available at http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/
pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf. See also id. ¶ 6-19 (making a further distinction between an “unlawful 
enemy combatant” or an individual “associated with or supporting the unlawful enemy com-
batants”). This field manual on interrogation replaces the 1992 field manual, and this revised 
version was publicly released on September 6, 2006.
100 See id. app. M.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 60–65. See also Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at 
606–10.
102 “[T]he Government is refining its position with respect to its authority to detain those 
persons who are now being held at Guantanamo Bay.” March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 
(emphasis added). 
103 Press Release, Ctr. For Constitutional Rights, Obama Administration Offers Essentially 
Same Definition of Enemy Combatant Without Using the Term (Mar. 13, 2009), available at
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The Government pointed out in its memorandum that it is “refining 
its position with respect to its authority to detain those persons who are now 
being held at Guantánamo Bay”,104 not “to define the contours of authority 
for military operations generally, or detention in other contexts.”105
As development of a comprehensive detention policy, which may 
introduce further changes, is underway at the time of this writing,
Thus, 
this is an internment standard, not a targeting standard nor a determination 
of personal jurisdiction for use of military tribunals. If use of this definition 
remains limited solely as an internment standard, many of the concerns re-
lated to the “enemy combatant” category discussed above do not arise. If it 
does not, the refinements made to the definition are insufficient to alleviate 
those concerns. 
106 the 
focus here must be on what can be evaluated at this time—whether this new 
definition in the March 13 memorandum comports with the requirements of 
IHL as relates to internment. Prior to doing so, however, it must be repeated 
that, if no armed conflict exists, the Government’s basis for its authority to 
intern (i.e., the AUMF) should not be “necessarily informed by the prin-
ciples of the laws of war.”107
The March 13 memorandum provides the following definitional 
framework for review of the habeas petitions:
Rather, the AUMF would need to be informed 
by relevant international human rights law and domestic law.
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those respon-
sible for those attacks. The President also has the authority to detain per-
sons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida 
forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a 
http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/obama-administration-offers-essentially-
same-definition-enemy-combatant-with. 
104 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 2. 
106 See Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009); Executive Order; Dec-
laration of Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 
¶¶ 3, 11 (March 13, 2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090313-LS-ag-
declaration.pdf. See Memorandum from Brad Wiegmann and Col. Mark Martins to the At-
torney General and Secretary of Defense Regarding the Preliminary Report of the Detention 
Policy Task Force (July 20, 2009), available at http://a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/
Preliminary_Report_Detention_Policy_Task_Force.pdf.
107 See March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality).
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belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy 
armed forces.108
The March 13 memorandum makes clear that the U.S. Government analo-
gizes to IHL, particularly “from traditional international armed conflicts.”109
The Government’s preference for the Third Geneva Convention over the 
Fourth Geneva Convention becomes evident in its response to the petition-
er’s assertion that the U.S. authority to intern is limited to those “directly 
participating in hostilities”.110 The Government is correct that its authority 
to intern under IHL applicable to international armed conflict is broader 
(even as under the Third Geneva Convention with regard to those accompa-
nying the armed forces111) and the Government could simply have referred 
by analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention.112 Instead, the March 13 me-
morandum refers to the “law-of-war principle of military necessity”113 and 
the language of Common Article 3 and Articles 1(1) and 13 of the Second 
Additional Protocol, which reference “armed groups”.114
It must be recalled that Common Article 3 and Articles 1(1) and 13 
of the Second Additional Protocol apply to non-international armed conflict 
in which a non-State actor is a party to the conflict, hence the reference to 
“armed groups”.115 The Government’s reference to these provisions focus-
ing on “armed groups” seems unnecessary and confusing and would seem to 
indicate that the United States believes it may only intern members of a 
fighting force, albeit it would consider such a fighting force to be defined 
more broadly than those persons covered by Article 4 of the Third Geneva 
Convention, i.e., those entitled to prisoner-of-war status.116
In analyzing whether the above definitional framework is consistent 
with IHL standards for internment, its two sentences will be addressed sepa-
rately. The first sentence of the March 13 memorandum states: 
If that is the 
correct reading of the U.S. position, the March 13 memorandum’s analysis 
raises a red flag that concerns could arise similar to those regarding the 
“enemy combatant” category, particularly if the definitional framework is 
applied beyond the purposes stated in the memorandum, e.g., for targeting 
purposes and not merely internment.
108 Id. at 2.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 8, 9.
111 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4). 
112 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 42, 78.
113 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 8–9.
114 See id. (discussing Common Article 3 and the Second Additional Protocol).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 8.
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The President has the authority to detain persons that the President deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those respon-
sible for those attacks.117
This sentence, while appearing to track the language of the AUMF, omits an 
important clause—a clause limiting the Executive’s authority to intern. That 
clause from the AUMF is the following: “in order to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organi-
zations or persons.”118
IHL may only inform this internment standard if armed conflict oc-
curred and continued after September 11, 2001 such that IHL applies. The 
U.S. Government considers that an armed conflict did continue, but others 
consider that, if an armed conflict took place on September 11, 2001,
By its plain language, the AUMF does not permit the 
use of force against these specific persons unless it is to prevent future ter-
rorist acts. Criminal law enforcement is the appropriate means for address-
ing criminal acts that have been committed. 
119
Assuming that the armed conflict was ongoing from September 11, 
2001 such that IHL continued to apply to those captured after that date, it 
must be recalled from the discussion above that the only bases for intern-
ment would be if a person is a member of the fighting force (an analogy to 
the Third Geneva Convention) or if reasons of security make it imperative 
to do so (an analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention). Past acts alone do 
not meet either standard. Thus, while a person who “planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001”
that 
particular conflict ended with the later conflict in Afghanistan being a sepa-
rate conflict (Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in October 2001). 
If the conflict (began and) ended on September 11, 2001, IHL (even if ap-
plied by analogy) provides no basis for internment of persons after that date, 
and IHL requires release of those interned in relation to the September 11, 
2001 conflict unless the persons are held on criminal charges for violations 
of the laws of war, such as war crimes. 
120
The second sentence of the March 13 memorandum states that:
may certainly be held on criminal charges, he or she may only be 
captured and interned (under IHL) after September 11, 2001 if he or she 
continues to be a member of the fighting force or continues to pose an im-
perative security threat in the present or in the future.
117 Id. at 2. 
118 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 
18, 2001) (emphasis added). 
119 That is, if an armed conflict occurred, rather than a horrific criminal act.
120 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 
18, 2001). 
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The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or 
substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces 
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has 
directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.121
As just mentioned, according to IHL a person may be interned if that person 
is a member of the fighting force (an analogy to the Third Geneva Conven-
tion) or if that person poses an imperative security threat in the present or in 
the future (an analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention). Preventive securi-
ty detention is forward looking. Past acts alone may be the basis for crimi-
nal charges but alone are insufficient for internment. Hence the definitional 
framework’s use of the past tense, for example, “were part of”, “has com-
mitted”, or “supported”, could be cause for concern. However, the choice of 
past tense language may merely reflect the fact that the habeas review pro-
vided by the Supreme Court in Boumediene has, until recently,122 been un-
derstood by the D.C. District Court to be a limited review of only the initial
determination for internment;123
Turning to the specific language of the second sentence of the defi-
nitional framework, the new definition requires a demonstration of “sub-
stantial” support of Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces engaged 
in hostilities against the United States and its collation partners, while the 
CSRT definition of “enemy combatant” required only “support” of those 
forces. Clearly, the new definition mandates passing a higher threshold than 
the CSRT definition to justify internment. However, it is not clear whether 
the new definition is better than the MCA definition of “unlawful enemy 
combatant”, which focused on involvement in the hostilities (“purposefully 
and materially supported hostilities”) rather than on how one supported a 
particular group. 
hence, the review is backward looking. The 
court is reviewing whether the initial decision to intern was valid, not 
whether the continued internment is justified (as required for civilian inter-
nees under the Fourth Geneva Convention). 
121 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 2.
122 See Basardh v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH) (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), availa-
ble at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136. See also infra
text accompanying notes 147–57.
123 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). The Supreme Court mandated that 
those interned at Guantánamo receive access to U.S. federal courts empowered to correct 
errors after “meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to 
detain.” Id. at 2269. The Court made clear that it was “not address[ing] the content of the law 
that governs petitioners’ detention.” Id. at 2277. The Court also delegated to lower courts 
resolution of procedural issues in relation to the habeas petitions. Id. at 2276.
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Furthermore, the significance of the additional word “substantial” 
was left unclear by the Government, as it refrained from defining it in its 
memorandum:
It is neither possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to identify, in the 
abstract, the precise nature and degree of “substantial support,” or the pre-
cise characteristics of “associated forces,” that are or would be sufficient to 
bring persons and organizations within the foregoing framework. Although 
the concept of “substantial support,” for example, does not justify the de-
tention at Guantanamo Bay of those who provide unwitting or insignifi-
cant support to the organizations identified in the AUMF, and the Gov-
ernment is not asserting that it can detain anyone at Guantanamo on such 
grounds, the particular facts and circumstances justifying detention will 
vary from case to case, and may require the identification and analysis of 
various analogues from traditional international armed conflicts. Accor-
dingly, the contours of the “substantial support” and “associated forces” 
bases of detention will need to be further developed in their application to 
concrete facts in individual cases.124
This new standard—as with the former—still includes individuals who were 
“part of . . . Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged 
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” Thus, it 
appears that membership alone is grounds for internment. Depending upon 
how being “part of” is understood, this standard could be very broad indeed. 
A person who is sympathetic to the objectives of al-Qaeda and carries a 
membership card could meet this definition. Such a standard is broader than 
that foreseen by either the Third or Fourth Geneva Conventions. That “as-
sociated forces” is modified by reference to engagement in hostilities—
language usually reserved for armed conflicts—should help to restrain ap-
plication only to situations rising to the level of armed conflict.125 Also the 
March 13 Memorandum mentions that being “part of” may depend on a 
“formal or functional analysis of the individual’s role.”126 This too indicates 
that membership may not be defined (or applied) too broadly, as it is similar 
to the “membership approach” taken in determining who permanently di-
rectly participates in hostilities.127
The U.S. Government has indicated that this definitional framework 
may evolve as the executive branch develops its comprehensive detention 
policy.128
124 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 2.
And, the Executive Order specifically concerning disposition of 
125 But see Exec. Order No. 13,493, supra note 106, at 4901 (mentioning “in connection 
with armed conflict and counter-terrorism operations” (emphasis added)).
126 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 6.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
128 See March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 2. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,493, supra 
note 106; Declaration of Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 106.
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those interned at Guantánamo makes explicit reference to consideration of 
the “interests of justice”129
IV. HABEAS REVIEW OF DETENTION AT GUANTÁNAMO: THE D.C.
DISTRICT COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERNMENT STANDARDS
in such determinations. While that is positive, 
ensuring that a standard of internment does not sweep too broadly should 
not rest on such discretion alone.
As of this writing, the D.C. District Court has ruled on thirty-five 
petitions under both the Bush and Obama Administrations.130 In twenty-
nine of those cases, the judges have decided that the Government has failed 
to establish “by a preponderance of the evidence”131 that it had justification 
in holding those individuals and thus, ordered their release.132
This section reviews some of these cases in order to assess whether 
the D.C. District Court’s decisions are consistent with IHL internment stan-
dards. This analysis will look to see whether application of the Bush Ad-
ministration’s definition of “enemy combatant” or the new definition pro-
vided by the Obama Administration extend, in particular, beyond the Fourth 
Geneva Convention standard of “imperative reasons of security”, as this 
standard is broader in scope than that found in the Third Geneva Conven-
tion. If this is the case, then individuals are not being held in compliance 
with IHL. In addition, this analysis will look at whether the court applies the
Government’s standards more restrictively than IHL permits. If that is so, 
the bases for this determination will be examined. It is one thing for the 
Government to apply a detention standard more narrowly than permitted 
under IHL, as no detaining authority is required to hold all individuals for 
which IHL authorizes internment. It is quite a different thing for the court to 
interpret the IHL internment standards more narrowly than traditionally 
understood. An overly narrow interpretation could significantly impact 
“warfighting” and the protective aims of IHL.133
This review remains limited to the court’s interpretation of the in-
ternment standards, including the factors that the court considers meet the 
129 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). See also Exec. Order No. 
13,493, supra note 106, at 4901.
130 Rosenberg, supra note 3. See also supra note 3.
131 See, e.g, Case Management Order at 3, Boumediene v. Bush, Civil Action No. 04-CV-
1166 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008).
132 See Rosenberg, supra note 3. 
133 Narrowing the scope of whom IHL permits to be interned shifts the balance of interests 
at stake. The purpose of internment is not to punish, but only to hinder the individuals’ direct 
involvement in the armed conflict and/or to protect them. “The protection by [IHL] consti-
tutes a compromise between the interest of the detaining power, the interest of the power on 
which the prisoner depends, and the prisoner’s own interests.” SASSÒLI ET AL., supra note 17, 
at 155. 
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standards. This section does not analyze either the court’s procedures or 
how the court assesses the evidence.134
A. What Is Being Reviewed?
Of course, even this limited review 
is hampered by the fact that much of the information on which the decisions 
are based remains classified and is either excluded or redacted from the 
judgments. Despite this hindrance, a few observations can be made.
Until mid-March 2009,135 all judges employed the Bush Adminis-
tration’s definition of “enemy combatant”.136 In reviewing the habeas peti-
tions, all judges of the D.C. District Court, with the exception of Judge Hu-
velle,137
134 See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting a presump-
tion of accuracy for the Government’s evidence and holding that “the accuracy of much of 
the factual material contained in [the Government’s] exhibits is hotly contested for a host of 
different reasons . . . ,” but employing “the mosaic theory” rather than proving directly that 
the internee was a terrorist); Al-Adahi v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK) (D.D.C. 
Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Al-
Adahi-opinion-8-21-09.pdf (memorandum decision discussing the “mosaic theory” and 
circumstantial evidence); Bostan v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-883 (RBW), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 73583 *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2009) (memorandum decision addressing relatively strict-
ly the admissibility of hearsay); Kahn v. Obama, Civil Action No. 08-1101 (JDB), 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 73025 *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2009) (memorandum decision addressing how 
judges should address evidence in the form of intelligence reports).
have not been providing a periodic review as to whether there exist 
factors that justified the internee’s continued internment, as required, for 
example, by the Fourth Geneva Convention with respect to the internment 
of civilians in an international armed conflict. Rather, most judges are re-
viewing whether the initial decision to intern the individual was correct, 
135 Judge Bates did not follow Judge Leon’s employment of the Bush Administration’s 
definition of “enemy combatant”. Instead, he requested clarification from the Obama Admin-
istration. See supra text accompanying notes 102–134 (regarding the Obama Administra-
tion’s response in its March 13 filing).
136 On October 23, 2008, the court heard oral arguments from the parties regarding the 
appropriate definition of “enemy combatant” to be employed in these hearings. Boumediene 
v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2008). Four days later, the court issued a 
Memorandum Order adopting the definition which had been drafted by the Department of 
Defense in 2004 for the type of Combatant Status Review Tribunal proceedings that these 
detainees were given. Id. at 135. The following definition of “enemy combatant” governs the 
proceedings: 
An “enemy combatant” is an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or 
al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed 
a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.
Id. 
137 See Basardh v. Obama, No. 05-889 (ESH) (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), available at
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136. See infra notes 166–
75 and accompanying text.
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thus permitting internment until the end of hostilities. And, while “acknow-
ledg[ing] the power of Judge Huvelle’s argument,”138 Judge James Robert-
son declares that it “is not for me to decide. Combat operations in Afghanis-
tan continue to this day and—in my view—the President’s ‘authority to 
detain for the duration of the relevant conflict’ which is ‘based on 
longstanding law-of-war principles’ has yet to ‘unravel.’”139
Judge Richard Leon explains “the question before this Court is 
whether the Government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 
each petitioner is being lawfully detained . . . .”140 and thus may remain 
interned. This type of review is more akin to an Article 5 Tribunal141 used to 
determine, when in doubt, whether someone in an international armed con-
flict is a prisoner of war and can be interned for the duration of hostilities. 
However, as discussed above, the definition of “enemy combatant” does not 
comport with the definition of “prisoner of war” found in the Third Geneva 
Convention.142 Judge Huvelle’s contrasting approach to review is discussed 
in more detail below.143
B. Application of the Bush Administration’s “Enemy Combatant” 
Standard 
Despite the concerns raised above that the “enemy combatant” 
standard sweeps more broadly than IHL standards,144 Judge Leon—using 
the Bush Administration’s definition145—has granted writs of habeas,146
138 Awad v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75374 *1, *9 
(D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2009).
which could indicate that this standard is being applied in practice in such a 
way that it does not reach beyond the permissible bases to intern under IHL. 
The following section provides a more in depth review to see if this is true.
139 Id. at 8 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)).
140 Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008) (employing the
“enemy combatant” definition). Judge Bates did not follow Judge Leon’s employment of the 
Bush Administration’s definition of “enemy combatant”. Instead, he requested clarification 
from the Obama Administration. See infra text accompanying notes 198–221.
141 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 5.
142 Id. art. 4. For concerns regarding the over-inclusive nature of “enemy combatant”, see
supra text accompanying notes 93–101.
143 See infra text accompanying notes 168–177.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 93–101.
145 See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008).
146 See, e.g., id. (granting the petitions and ordering the release of Lakhdar Boumediene, 
Mohamed Nechlas, Hadj Boudella, Mustafa Alt Idir, and Saber Lahmar); El Gharani v. Bush, 
593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009); Al Ginco v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-1310
(RJL) (D.D.C. June 22, 2009), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/
detention/gitmo/janko_unclassified_release_order.pdf.
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In most of the cases in which Judge Leon denies the writ, he lists 
multiple actions by the petitioner to demonstrate that the petitioner was 
“part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces” and, thus, an “enemy 
combatant”. For example, in Sliti v. Bush,147 Judge Leon found it “more 
probable than not that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan as an al Qaeda 
recruit and trained at the local military training camp . . . .”148 He based his 
conclusion on evidence that the petitioner had traveled to Afghanistan with 
financial support from extremists with ties to al-Qaeda, spent time during 
the trip with close associates of al-Qaeda, stayed free of charge at a guest-
house in Afghanistan frequented by individuals with close ties to terrorist 
organizations, and admitted knowledge of the location of the local al-Qaeda 
military camp and its code words.149 Judge Leon has indicated that he con-
siders that “facilitating the travel of others to join the fight against the Unit-
ed States in Afghanistan constitutes direct support to al-Qaida . . . .”150
Judge Leon, in denying the petition for writ, made clear in Al Alwi 
v. Bush that “the Government does not need to prove [that the petitioner 
actually took up arms against the United States or coalitional forces] in or-
der for the petitioner to be classified as an enemy combatant . . . .”
However, under IHL simply facilitating travel does not make one a comba-
tant, but, depending upon the directness of the involvement, could demon-
strate the necessity for “imperative reasons of security” to intern the indi-
vidual. It remains to be seen which other specific, single acts Judge Leon 
will consider as the minimum for “support”. In other words, which one act 
will be found sufficient in and of itself to establish an individual as an 
“enemy combatant”? Will this “bottom line”, for example, stray below the 
threshold set by the IHL standards if analogously applied to non-
international armed conflict? 
151 IHL 
also does not require such a showing for a civilian to be considered an im-
perative threat to security, nor necessarily to be a “combatant”, if, for exam-
ple, the individual, not taking up arms directly, commanded operations. 
Judge Leon also specified that “participation in a battle against U.S. and 
allied forces would be . . . strong evidence of enemy combatancy”,152 as 
would be attendance at an al-Qaeda-affiliated training camp, acting as a 
courier for certain senior al-Qaeda operatives, and membership in an al-
Qaeda cell.153
147 592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2008).
Also, under IHL these factors could be evidence of comba-
148 Id. at 51.
149 Id. at 50–51.
150 Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008).
151 Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2008) (emphasis in original).
152 El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 148 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009).
153 Id.
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tancy or at minimum an imperative threat to security. In a later case, Judge 
Leon denied the writ, agreeing with the Government that the petitioner had 
fought against U.S. and Afghan forces at the battle of Tora Bora,154 making 
him an “enemy combatant” because he was “part of or supporting al Qaeda 
or Taliban forces.”155
Judge Leon’s denial of Al Bihani’s petition gained attention
The fact of taking up arms could justify internment 
under IHL under either the Third Geneva Convention or, if he remained 
a threat at the time of his capture or in the future, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. 
156
[F]aithfully serving in an al Qaeda affiliated fighting unit that is directly 
supporting the Taliban by helping to prepare the meals of its entire fight-
ing force is more than sufficient “support” to meet this Court’s definition. 
After all, as Napoleon himself was fond of pointing out: “an army marches 
on its stomach.”
when he wrote that:
157
Such a statement raises concerns as to the extent that “war sustaining” ef-
forts are going to be considered “support” by the D.C. District Court for 
purposes of internment. Are farmers selling their crops to feed al-Qaeda 
fighters or ammunition factory workers also “enemy combatants”? General 
war sustaining efforts fail to meet the standard of internment for civilians 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention (“imperative reasons of security”) and 
certainly do not make one a “combatant”.158
While Judge Leon’s particular statement gives pause, review of the 
complete facts of this case may lessen concern. Taking a closer look at Al 
Bihani v. Obama, it appears that Al Bihani was not merely a cook but was 
also issued a weapon while serving under an al-Qaeda military command-
er.159
154 See Hammamy v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-429 (RJL) (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009), avail-
able at http://ccrjustice.org/files/2009-04-02%20Hedi%20Hammamy%20habeas%20denied.
pdf (memorandum order denying Hammamy’s petition for writ of habeas corpus). The writ 
was denied based on an intelligence report that Hammamy’s papers were found after the 
Battle of Tora Bora in the al-Qaeda cave complex, and Hammamy’s conduct in Italy, where 
he was under investigation for involvement in an Islamic terrorist cell, just prior to his arrival 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Id. at 7–8. Despite this order being issued subsequent to the 
Obama Administration’s announcement of a revised standard for the detention of individuals 
at Guantanamo, Judge Leon held that the “definition of ‘enemy combatant’ previously 
adopted by this Court in the Boumediene cases, governs the[se] proceedings.” Id. at 5.
Thus, it would appear that Al Bihani could be called to combat if 
155 Id. at 6.
156 See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilber, U.S. Can Continue Yemeni’s Detention, WASH. POST,
Jan. 29, 2009, at A4.
157 Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2009).
158 See supra text accompanying notes 31–50.
159 Al Bihani, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 39-40.
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needed. This is analogous to a member of a State’s armed forces, who may 
serve as a cook but is also trained for combat. Finally, it should be recalled
that the Third Geneva Convention permits the internment of civilians who 
accompany the armed forces providing services; however, such individuals 
are not combatants.160
More recently, in Al Ginco v. Obama,161 Judge Leon made clear 
that even if it is established that an individual had been “part of” the Taliban 
or al-Qaeda that does not make one an “enemy combatant” permanently. 
Judge Leon looked at a variety of factors and determined, in granting the 
petitioner’s writ, that the pre-existing relationship had sufficiently been 
eroded over a sustained period of time162 prior to Al Ginco’s internment by 
the United States.163 In so doing, Judge Leon implied that staying at a 
guesthouse or going to a training camp alone or in combination are not nec-
essarily sufficient factors to make one an “enemy combatant”: “[F]ive days 
at a guesthouse in Kabul combined with eighteen days at a training camp 
does not add up to a longstanding bond of brotherhood.”164
While Judge Leon, in granting Al Ginco’s petition, recognized that 
a new standard had been presented by the Obama Administration, he did not 
reach the question of whether to adopt the Government’s new definition in 
this case because “[t]he Government’s theory of lawful detention here is not 
based on ‘support’ to either the Taliban or al Qaeda, but rather petitioner’s 
being ‘part of’ the Taliban or al Qaeda when he was taken into custody.”
This is consis-
tent with an IHL analysis.
165
160 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4). As such persons working closely 
with the armed forces risked capture and should not be excluded from protection, they were 
included in the Third Geneva Convention because their “position when captured had given 
rise to difficulties during the Second World War.” 3 COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 64 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 
1958) (regarding Article 4(A)(4)). 
Other judges of the D.C. District Court have addressed the new standard 
161 Al Ginco v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-1310 (RJL) (D.D.C. June 22, 2009), available 
at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/janko_unclassified_release_
order.pdf (memorandum order granting Al Ginco’s petition for writ of habeas corpus).
162 Id. at 10–12.
163 Judge Leon explains:
[C]ombining the limited and brief nature of Janko’s relationship with al Qaeda 
(and/or the Taliban), with the extreme conduct by his captors over a prolonged pe-
riod of time, the conclusion is inescapable that his preexisting relationship, such as 
it was, was sufficiently vitiated that he was no longer “part of” al Qaeda (or the Ta-
liban) at the time he was taken into custody . . . .
Id. at 12.
164 Id. at 11.
165 Id. at 6.
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presented by the Obama Administration. Those opinions are discussed 
below. 
C. Interpreting the Obama Administration’s New Internment Standard
At the time of this writing, six decisions on petitions for habeas 
corpus have been handed down based on this new standard. Five166 have 
been granted, and one denied.167 Judge Huvelle, in her opinion of April 15, 
2009 granting Basardh’s habeas petition, provided the first interpretation of 
the new standard. She wrote that “the only issue before the Court is a nar-
row one—what, if any, relevance does Basardh’s [REDACTED] have to a 
determination of the lawfulness of his continued detention?”168 Judge Hu-
velle based her review on the lawfulness of Basardh’s continued deten-
tion—rather than the initial decision to detain—on the language of the 
AUMF, as the Executive now rests its authority on the AUMF as “informed 
by principle of the laws of war.”169 She wrote: “The statutory language of 
the AUMF, which defines the Executive’s detention authority in plain and 
unambiguous terms, speaks only to the prevention of ‘future acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States.’”170
Thus, Judge Huvelle concluded that “the AUMF does not authorize 
the detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent those 
individuals from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to au-
thorize detention where its purpose can no longer be attained.”171
166 See Basardh v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH) (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), availa-
ble at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136; Bacha v. 
Obama, Civil Action No. 05-2385 (ESH), 2009 WL 2365846 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009); Al 
Mutairi v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173 (D.D.C. July 
29, 2009); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. May 11, 2009); Al-Adahi v. Ob-
ama, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK) (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Al-Adahi-opinion-8-21-09.pdf.
She points 
to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdi as recognizing the Executive’s 
167 See Awad v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2009), available 
at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/Mohammed_Ali_Awad_Trial
_Court_Decision.pdf. An additional petition was denied just as this article was submitted, 
thus, it is not included in this analysis. See Al Odah v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-
828 (CKK) (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2009/08/Al-Odah-ruling-by-CKK-8-24-091.pdf.
168 Basardh, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 2–3 (emphasis added).
169 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 
(2004) (plurality)).
170 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 8 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (emphasis added in memoran-
dum)).
171 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 8.
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authority to “detain combatants for a limited purpose only”172—“to prevent 
the captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up 
arms again.”173
[T]his limitation on the Executive’s detention authority is consistent with 
the administrative procedures that the government adopted in 2004 for the 
CSRT and Administrative Review Board proceedings for determining 
whether continued detention of a detainee is justified. In both sets of rules, 
the government is obligated to perform ongoing threat assessments of de-
tainees based upon the detainee’s current status.
In addition, Judge Huvelle pointed out that:
174
Judge Huvelle’s approach to habeas review is analogous to the periodic 
review required for civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention.175
The primary factor in Judge Huvelle’s decision to grant Basardh’s 
writ was that the petitioner’s cooperation while at Guantánamo—for which 
he suffered physical attacks and credible death threats from other inter-
nees
As of 
this writing only Judge Huvelle has adopted this approach. 
176—was publicly known, thus severing any ties with the enemy and 
foreclosing any risk that he could rejoin the enemy. Hence, Judge Huvelle 
concluded “that the government has failed to meet its burden of establishing 
that Basardh’s continued detention is authorized under the AUMF’s direc-
tive that such force be used ‘in order to prevent future acts of international 
terrorism.’”177
In late July 2009, Judge Huvelle granted another petition.
This result is consistent with that which should be reached if 
the internment standard found in the Fourth Geneva Convention, pertaining 
to civilians, were employed. Internment of such an individual could no
longer be deemed necessary “for imperative reasons of security”.
178
172 Id.
As 
Judge Huvelle’s opinion on this case is unavailable at the time of this writ-
173 Id. at 9 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518).
174 Id. at 9. See July 7 Memo, supra note 87, ¶ 13(i); Memorandum from the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, at enclosure 3 (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
175 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 43, 78(2).
176 Basardh v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 4 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), avail-
able at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136.
177 Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
178 Bacha v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-2385 (ESH), 2009 WL 2365846 (D.D.C. July 30, 
2009) (granting Bacha’s petition for writ of habeas corpus). This case received attention due 
to Judge Huvelle’s expressed outrage at the flimsiness of Government’s case, based primari-
ly on statements the petitioner made as a result of torture. See, e.g., William Glaberson, U.S. 
Judge Challenges Evidence on a Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/23gitmo.html?_r=1; Evan Perez & Jess Bravin, U.S. 
Plans to Free an Afghan Detainee, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2009, at A6, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124892208846392665.html. See also Transcript of Hearing
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ing, it remains to be seen what further insight it may provide on the factors 
she considers meet the Government’s new standard authorizing continued
detention.
Just a few days after Judge Huvelle’s decision in Basardh v. 
Bush,179 Judge Reggie Walton provided a detailed opinion on the Obama 
Administration’s refined internment standard.180 First, Judge Walton ad-
dressed whether the AUMF authorizes the detention of individuals in a non-
international armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda. He 
determined that this issue must be addressed as he had concluded that IHL 
applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts provides 
no such authority.181 When Judge Walton speaks of detention, he does not 
speak to the IHL distinction between penal or disciplinary sanction (deten-
tion) versus preventive detention (internment); rather, he discusses battle-
field capture.182
Judge Walton concluded that authorization for detention must be 
found elsewhere.
In that regard, IHL provides no explicit authority to capture 
combatants on the battlefield, in the same way that it does not explicitly 
provide a right, but merely does not prohibit, killing combatants on the 
battlefield. 
183 He concluded that the Supreme Court decisions in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld184 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld185 already determined that 
the AUMF authorizes detention.186 In Hamdi and Hamdan, the Supreme 
Court respectively held that the AUMF extends to detention under the ap-
plicable IHL and that the United States is engaged in a non-international 
armed conflict in Afghanistan.187
Before The Honorable Ellen Segal Huvelle, Bacha v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-2385
(ESH) (D.D.C. July 30, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2009/07/jawad-hearing-7-16-09.pdf.
No court has yet addressed whether the 
AUMF authorizes preventive detention outside of armed conflict.
179 Basardh v. Bush, Civil Action No. 05-cv-889 (ESH), 2009 WL 856345 (D.D.C. March 
31, 2009) (final judgment granting Basardh’s petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
180 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
181 See id. at 59–61.
182 See generally id.
183 See generally id. at 61.
184 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
185 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
186 See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
187 In relation to Afghanistan, the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held: 
[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of “necessary and appro-
priate force” to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant con-
flict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the 
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts 
that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. 
But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations 
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Having determined that the AUMF authorizes detention, Judge 
Walton then addressed the standard for such detention. He correctly rejected 
the petitioner’s argument that only persons who directly participate in hos-
tilities can be detained.188
First, he explained that the detention standard covers those persons 
who are members of a fighting force that permanently directly participate in 
hostilities.
He concluded that the detention standard is 
broader. 
189
[A]gree[ed] with the government that the criteria set forth in Article 4 of 
the Third Geneva Convention and Article 43 of the Additional Protocol 
I[
In order to determine membership in the fighting forces of the 
enemy, the court:
190] should inform the Court’s assessment as to whether an individual 
qualifies as a member of the “armed forces” of an enemy organization like 
al-Qaeda.191
Judge Walton provided examples:
Thus, mere sympathy for or association with an enemy organization does 
not render an individual a member of that enemy organization’s armed 
forces. Instead, the individual must have some sort of “structured” role in 
the “hierarchy” of the enemy force . . . . Sympathizers, propagandists, and 
financiers who have no involvement with this “command structure,” while 
perhaps members of the enemy organization in an abstract sense, cannot be 
considered part of the enemy’s “armed forces” . . . .192
Second, he considered the standard to also cover those persons who are not 
analogous to combatants but are nevertheless part of the armed forces. 
Judge Walton clarified:
against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan. . . . The United 
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately de-
termined to be Taliban combatants who “engaged in an armed conflict against the 
United States.” If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved 
in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of “ne-
cessary and appropriate force,” and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.
542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). And, in Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466 (2004), the Supreme Court confirmed the U.S. position that there existed an armed 
conflict at that time, although the Court did not specify the type of armed conflict. Id. at 470.
But see supra text accompanying note 7.
188 Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 65–67.
189 See id. at 63–67. See discussion supra accompanying notes 58–61 (regarding the 
“membership approach”).
190 The United States is not party to the First Additional Protocol.
191 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
192 Id. at 68–69.
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The key question is whether an individual “receive[s] and execute[s] or-
ders” from the enemy force’s combat apparatus, not whether he is an al-
Qaeda fighter. Thus, an al-Qaeda member tasked with housing, feeding, or 
transporting al-Qaeda fighters could be detained as part of the enemy 
armed forces notwithstanding his lack of involvement in the actual fight-
ing itself, but an al-Qaeda doctor or cleric, or the father of an al-Qaeda 
fighter who shelters his son out of familial loyalty, could not be detained 
assuming such individuals had no independent role in al-Qaeda’s chain of 
command.193
Judge Walton, in fact, analogized to those persons who are not combatants 
and yet are still entitled to prisoner-of-war status, that is civilians formally 
accompanying a State’s armed forces but are not members of it.194
the Court conclude[d] as a matter of law that, in addition to the authority 
conferred upon him by the plain language of the AUMF, the President has 
the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially sup-
ported, the Taliban or al-Qaeda forces that are engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners, provided that the terms 
“substantially supported” and “part of” are interpreted to encompass on-
ly individuals who were members of the enemy organization’s armed 
forces, as that term is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their 
capture.
To this 
limited extent then, 
195
The court’s understanding of the internment standard directly paral-
lels Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.196 No mention, however, is 
made of the standard of internment contained in the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion,197
193 Id. at 69 (alterations in original).
which is broader in scope but does not necessarily permit internment 
until the end of hostilities. Judge Walton’s interpretation of the new deten-
194 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, at 4(A)(4). IHL treaty provisions stipulate 
that persons accompanying the armed forces, such as “supply contractors [and] members of 
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces”, are not comba-
tants, as medical and religious personnel are not. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, 
arts. 4(A)(4), 33. “Also excluded in the case of conflicts involving irregularly constituted 
armed groups are ‘political and religious leaders . . . [and] financial contributors, informants, 
collaborators and other service providers without fighting function [who] may support or 
belong to an opposition movement or an insurgency as a whole, but can hardly be regarded 
as members of its ‘armed forces’ in the functional sense underlying IHL.’” Goodman, supra 
note 48, at 53, (citing NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (2008)).
195 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70–71 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009) (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
196 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4.
197 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 42, 78.
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tion standard is narrower than the previously applied “enemy combatant” 
standard and probably narrower than the Obama Administration intended. 
Originally, the Obama Administration submitted the Government’s 
new position with respect to its authority to intern the individuals held at 
Guantánamo Bay in response to an order from Judge John Bates.198 In Ham-
lily v. Obama,199
The first sentence of the government’s proposal is taken almost verbatim 
from the AUMF itself and concerns the President’s authority to use force 
against, and hence to detain under Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521, those individu-
als who (i) were responsible for the September 11 attacks or (ii) harbored 
those who were responsible for the attacks. There is no debate that the 
President has authority to detain such individuals.
Judge Bates reviewed the Government’s refinements. 
Judge Bates accepted the Government’s authority to detain as stated in the 
first sentence of the Government’s position. He wrote:
200
Judge Bates, however, did not accept the Government’s framework in its 
entirety.201
[The Court] rejects the concept of “substantial support” as an independent 
basis for detention. . . . [and] finds that “directly support[ing] hostilities” is 
not a proper basis for detention. In short, the Court can find no authority in 
domestic law or the law of war, nor can the government point to any, to 
justify the concept of “support” as a valid ground for detention.
He wrote that:
202
As discussed above, application of the first sentence of the Gov-
ernment’s standard could be problematic under IHL.203 The concerns pre-
viously raised204 with regard to the second sentence, particularly the concern 
of “substantial support” being defined over-broadly, are eliminated by 
Judge Bates’s rejection of the concept of “substantial support,” with the 
Government having provided very little justification for its inclusion.205
198 See Hamlily v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-0763 (JDB) (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2009) (order 
requesting the Government to submit any refinement of their position on the appropriate 
definition of “enemy combatant”), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_
public_doc?2005cv2378-175.
199 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009).
200 Id. at 67 n.5.
201 Id. at 69.
202 Id.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 119–20.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 122–27.
205 See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 76 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009). The Hamlily 
opinion states that:
After repeated attempts by the Court to elicit a more definitive justification for the 
“substantial support” concept in the law of war, it became clear that the govern-
ment has none. Nevertheless, the government asserted that “substantial support” is 
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However, Judge Bates is wrong when he asserts that “directly sup-
porting hostilities” could provide no basis for internment under IHL. Of 
course, the validity of Judge Bates’s assertion depends upon how that 
phrase is defined. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that an individual need 
not “directly participate in hostilities” for internment to be authorized under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention for “imperative reasons of security.”206
In determining that the Government has authority to intern “persons 
who were part of . . . Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces”,
For 
example, providing intelligence to the enemy that seriously prejudices the 
state’s security would constitute direct support justifying internment, as an 
“imperative reason of security”. While the Government can always choose 
to apply a more restrictive standard, it would be incorrect to declare that 
under no circumstances does IHL provide authorization for such internment. 
207
[T]he lack of combatant status in non-international armed conflicts does 
not, by default, result in civilian status for all, even those who are mem-
bers of enemy “organizations” like al Qaeda. Moreover, the Government’s 
claimed authority to detain those who were “part of” those organizations is 
entirely consistent with the law of war principles that govern non-
international armed conflicts. Common Article 3, by its very terms, con-
templates the “detention” of “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities, 
including members of the armed forces who have laid down their weapons 
and those placed hor de combat,” . . . . At a minimum, this restriction es-
tablishes that States engaged in non-international armed conflict can detain 
those who are “part of” enemy armed groups.
Judge Bates entered into a controversial area of IHL. On whether this go-
vernmental focus on “membership” in organizations responsible for the 
September 11, 2001 attacks is consistent with IHL applicable to non-
international armed conflicts, which provides for no combatant status, Judge 
Bates concluded that: 
208
intended to cover those individuals “who are not technically part of al-Qaeda,” but 
who have some meaningful connection to the organization by, for example, provid-
ing financing. . . . [A] detention authority that sweeps so broadly is simply beyond 
what the law of war will support. The government’s approach in this respect evi-
dences an importation of principles from the criminal law context.
Id.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 31–50. It should also be recalled that persons ac-
companying the armed forces without being combatants may be interned as prisoner of war. 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4).
207 See March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 2.
208 Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009) (citing Third Geneva 
Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(1)). See also Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 52–53 
(D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
2009] GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS REVIEW 237
This issue, however, remains debated.209 While Judge Bates determined that 
this approach is consistent with IHL, he recognized that “the government’s 
position cannot be said to reflect customary international law because, can-
didly, none exists on this issue.”210
In addition, Judge Bates concluded that the authority to intern in-
cludes persons who were members of “associated forces”, which he inter-
preted to mean “‘co-belligerents’ as that term is understood under the law of 
war.”211 Judge Bates clarified that “‘[a]ssociated forces’ do not include ter-
rorist organizations who merely share an abstract philosophy or even a 
common purpose with al Qaeda—there must be an actual association in the 
current conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban.”212 This interpretation should 
assist in ensuring that application of the standard is not overbroad—limited 
to those groups actively participating in hostilities—and, thus, in a manner 
consistent with being a “party” to an armed conflict under IHL.213
The critical question then remains as to how one determines being
“part of” an armed group. Judge Bates described his approach as functional 
rather than formal. While he appears to be in agreement with Judge Wal-
ton’s conclusions in Gherebi v. Obama,214
“[M]ere sympathy for or association with an enemy organization does not 
render an individual a member” of that enemy organization. . . . The key
inquiry, then, is not necessarily whether one self-identifies as a member of 
the organization (although this could be relevant in some cases), but 
whether the individual functions or participates within or under the com-
mand structure of the organization—i.e., whether he receives and executes 
orders or directions. . . . Thus, as Gherebi observed, this could include an 
individual “tasked with housing, feeding, or transporting al-Qaeda fighters 
. . . but an al-Qaeda doctor or cleric, or the father of an al-Qaeda fighter 
who shelters his son out of familial loyalty, [is likely not detainable] as-
Judge Bates provides less 
reasoning behind his delimitations. He did, however, list some non-
exclusive factors—on their face not inconsistent with IHL—for making the 
determination:
209 See supra text accompanying note 56.
210 Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (citing Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the 
Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 190 (2005) (“[I]t is not clear 
whether members of armed opposition groups are civilians who lose their protection from 
attack when directly participating in hostilities or whether members of such groups are liable 
to attack as such.”). 
211 Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
212 Id. at 75 n.17.
213 See MELZER, supra note 194, at 248–50 (describing the quality of a “party” to an inter-
national armed conflict); id. at 254 (discussing how non-State actors qualify as a “party” to a 
non-international armed conflict). 
214 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
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suming such individuals had no independent role in al-Qaeda’s chain of 
command.” . . . Moreover, as the government conceded at oral argument, 
its framework does not encompass those individuals who unwittingly be-
come part of the al Qaeda apparatus—some level of knowledge or intent is 
required.215
Finally, Judge Bates agreed that the Government’s authority also 
includes “any person who has committed a belligerent act”, but he unders-
tood this to be “any person who has directly participated in hostilities.”216
While the standard of “direct participation in hostilities” under conventional 
IHL is used to assess when a civilian loses his or her protection against di-
rect attack,217 not his or her internment, it could, as discussed above,218 be a 
possible approach when analogizing to the Third Geneva Convention to 
determine who is a “fighter” in non-international armed conflict. Judge 
Bates acknowledged that the definition of “direct participation in hostilities” 
is at present unsettled, not being defined in treaty law,219
[L]ittle doubt exists that a civilian carrying out an attack would be directly 
participating in hostilities. In the same vein, legal experts seem to agree 
that civilians preparing or returning from combat are still considered to be 
directly participating in hostilities, although the precise indication as to 
when preparation begins and return ends remains controversial. 
thus he identified 
aspects of the standard that he considered settled and on which the court 
would rely: 
220
This is minimal guidance indeed. It remains to be seen how this standard 
will be developed through the court’s application. As Judge Bates stated, 
“further refinement of the concept of ‘direct participation’ will await ex-
amination of particular cases.” 221
Judges Walton’s and Bates’ interpretations of the internment stan-
dard differ in that Judge Walton did not reject outright, as did Judge Bates, 
the “‘support’-based elements.” Nevertheless, there appears to be a certain 
consistency between them, as “[w]ith the exception of these two ‘support’-
215 Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009) (citing Gherebi v. 
Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68–69 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
216 Id. at 70, 77.
217 See First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 51(3); Second Additional Protocol, 
supra note 14, art. 13(3).
218 See supra text accompany notes 48–50.
219 See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 72 n.14 (citing Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Report: 
Direct Participation in Hostilities (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.
nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-report_res/$File/2005-09-report-dph-2005-icrc.pdf).
220 Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (citing Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Report: Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, supra note 219).
221 Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
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based elements, . . . [Judge Bates] adopt[ed] the government’s proposed 
framework, largely for the reasons explained [by Judge Walton] in Ghere-
bi.”222 In particular, Judge Bates recognized that Judge Walton adopted the 
Government’s framework subject to a comprehensive interpretation of that 
standard.223
[W]hile the Court concludes that the concepts of “substantial support” and 
“direct support” are not, under the law of war, independent bases for de-
tention, evidence tending to demonstrate that a petitioner provided signifi-
cant “support” is relevant in assessing whether he was “part of” a covered 
organization (through membership or otherwise) or “committed a bellige-
rent act” (through direct participation in hostilities).
Thus, these two approaches may not result in significant differ-
ences in practice, particularly as Judge Bates indicated that:
224
In Mattan v. Obama, Judge Royce Lamberth adopted Judge Bates’ 
approach.225 Also, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly in Al Mutairi v. United 
States226 accepted the reasoning set forth in Judge Bates’ decision in Hamli-
ly v. Obama, “partially adopt[ing] the Government’s proposed definition of 
its detention authority.”227
[T]he Government has at best shown that some of Al Mutairi’s conduct 
is consistent with persons who may become part of al Wafa or al Qaida, 
but there is nothing in the record beyond speculation that Al Mutairi 
In applying that standard, Judge Kollar-Kotelly 
granted the petitioner’s writ, deciding that:
222 Id. at 69.
223 Id. at 69 n.11.
224 Id. at 70.
225 See Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. May 21, 2009). 
Accordingly, the Court will adopt respondents’ proposed definition except for the 
two “support”-related elements described above. However, the Court will still con-
sider support of Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated enemy forces in determining 
whether a detainee should be considered “part of” those forces. Such consideration 
of “support” factors is consistent with the Judge Bates’ opinion and, as Judge Bates 
noted, is not inconsistent with Judge Walton’s opinion . . . as applied.
Id. at 26 (footnote omitted). 
226 Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK) (D.D.C. July 29, 2009) (classified memorandum opinion 
explaining decision to grant habeas to detainee), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/
propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/al_mutairi_unclassified_court_opinion.pdf.
227 Id. at 7–8 (footnote omitted). The memorandum opinion further states that:
The Court agrees that the President has the authority to detain individuals who are 
“part of” the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated enemy forces, but rejects the Gov-
ernment’s definition insofar as it asserts the authority to detain individuals who on-
ly “substantially supported” enemy forces or who have “directly supported hostili-
ties” in aid of enemy forces. While evidence of such support is undoubtedly proba-
tive of whether an individual is part of the enemy force, it may not by itself provide 
the grounds for detention.
Id. at 8. See Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
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did, in fact, train with or otherwise become part of either or both 
organizations. . . .228
She considered that, “[i]n the context of this definition, the ‘key inquiry’ for 
determining whether an individual has become ‘part of’ one or more of 
these organizations is ‘whether the individual functions or participates with-
in or under the command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he 
receives and executes orders or directions.’”229
Judge Robertson also adopted Judge Bates’ approach, in Awad v. 
Obama.230 Unfortunately, as the opinion is so heavily redacted, it does not 
provide much insight as to which factors met the internment standard, such 
that the petitioner’s writ was denied. However, Judge Robertson indicated 
that “it appears more likely than not that Awad was, for some period of 
time, ‘part of’ al Qaida”231
At the very least Awad’s confessed reasons for traveling to Afghanistan 
and the correlation of names on a list [REDACTED] clearly tied to al Qai-
da make it more likely than not that he knew the al Qaida fighters at the 
hospital and joined them in the barricade [at the hospital].
because:
232
As Judge Robertson pointed out this “case against Awad is gossamer 
thin.”233 The fact that the standard can be met with such minimal evidence 
stresses the importance of being clear as to what this standard determines. 
There are very different ramifications for the individual if the standard de-
termines who may be interned, targeted, or subjected to trial by military 
commission.234 Judge Bates correctly assessed that “[t]he evidence is of a 
kind fit only for these unique proceedings . . . [as it] has very little 
weight.”235
In Ahmed v. Obama, Judge Gladys Kessler applied the Obama Ad-
ministration standard without qualification.236
228 Al Mutairi, Civil Action No. 02-828 at 32.
Despite the much redacted 
229 Al Odah v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2730489 *1, *17-
*18 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009) (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. May 
19, 2009)). 
230 Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379, at 5 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2009), available at http://s3.
amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/Mohammed_Ali_Awad_Trial_Court_
Decision.pdf.
231 Id. at 21.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 20.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 95–98.
235 Awad v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379, at 20–21 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2009), 
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/Mohammed_Ali_
Awad_Trial_Court_Decision.pdf (emphasis added).
236 See Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2009).
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opinion, it is possible to glean factors that Judge Kessler considered do and 
do not meet the standard. She granted the petitioner’s writ because the proof 
did not convince her that Ahmed “fought for the Taliban”, received military 
training, traveled in Afghanistan “with terrorists fleeing from the scene of 
war”, or demonstrated by a stay at a guesthouse that he “was a supporter of 
al-Qaida.”237 Judge Kessler did not consider “travel[ing] around Afghanis-
tan in 2001 and 2002 in the company of terrorist fighters fleeing the battle-
field”238 to constitute substantial support.239 However, she held that if the 
Government could prove that Ahmed had joined al-Qaeda and/or the Tali-
ban in battle against the United States and/or coalition forces, “this fact 
alone would almost certainly justify . . . detention.”240 As concerns the Gov-
ernment’s offer of evidence that Ahmed stayed at a guesthouse to establish 
that he is “a substantial supporter of al-Qaida and/or Taliban, as well as a 
trainee and fighter for one or both groups”,241 Judge Kessler pointed out that 
“[t]he validity of this argument rests in large part on a guilt-by-association 
theory . . . .”242 Judge Kessler required “solid evidence that Ali Ahmed en-
gaged in, or planned, any future wrongdoing while”243
More recently, Judge Kessler adopted Judge Walton’s approach to 
the standard of review.
there. She did not 
accept guilt by association.
244 Judge Kessler concluded that “Judge Walton’s 
opinion presented a clearer approach [than Judge Bates’] . . . .”245 In grant-
ing Al-Adahi’s petition, she determined that “[u]nable to prove the more 
serious allegation of actual participation in combat, the Government cannot 
rely solely on what is only associational evidence about Al-Ahadi’s stay at 
[REDACTED] and arrest in the company of individuals rumored to be part 
of the Taliban.”246 Referring to the AUMF and the standards in Gherebi,247
237 Id. at 66.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 59.
241 Id. at 66.
242 Id. at 63.
243 Id. at 64.
244 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK) (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Al-Adahi-opinion-8-21-
09.pdf.
245 Id. at 6.
246 Id. at 38.
247 See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68–69 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009) (stating that 
individuals must occupy “some sort of ‘structured’ role in the ‘hierarchy’ of the enemy 
force” and “‘receive[ ] and execute[] orders’ from the enemy force’s combat apparatus”); id. 
at 70–71 (stating that the President has the authority to detain persons who are members of 
al-Qaeda’s armed forces). 
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Judge Kessler concluded that the petitioner’s brief attendance at a training 
camp (the Government’s strongest allegation) and eventual expulsion from 
it248 “do not bring him within the ambit of the Executive’s power to de-
tain.”249 Judge Kessler’s refusal to accept guilt by association is consistent 
with the IHL requirement that individual determinations must be undertaken 
to assess whether there is an individual nexus.250
V. CONCLUSION
This analysis indicates that the D.C. District Court’s application of 
the Bush Administration’s definition of “enemy combatant” and the refined 
standard provided by the Obama Administration is in some ways narrower 
and in other ways potentially broader than the IHL standards. Thus, the con-
sistency of the D.C. District Court’s decisions with the internment standards 
under IHL is mixed. Nevertheless, the court has done an admirable job in 
handling certain complicated and unsettled issues under IHL, such as the 
meaning of “direct participation in hostilities” and the analogous application 
of “combatancy” to non-international armed conflicts.
Both the Bush and Obama Administrations and the court analogize 
to IHL of international armed conflicts in determining the internment stan-
dard to be applied. However, while it may be acceptable to apply the IHL 
standards of international armed conflict by analogy to non-international 
armed conflict, they do not apply to “counter-terrorism” operations not 
passing over the threshold into armed conflict. Thus, for any of those 
individuals at Guantánamo who are not interned in relation to an armed 
conflict, an IHL standard remains the wrong starting point for an internment 
determination. 
In their analogous application of IHL, both the Administrations and 
the court analogize solely to the Third Geneva Convention. No mention is 
made of the Fourth Geneva Convention. As a result, individuals meeting the 
designated standard may be interned for the duration of hostilities regardless 
of a change in circumstances. The one exception is Judge Huvelle, who 
conducts reviews on the necessity of continued internment. While the 
“combatant” standards are applied here to assess authorized internment, 
other effects result under IHL if one is designated as a “combatant”, namely 
that one may be directly targeted in hostilities. Thus, how the court inter-
248 See Al Ginco v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-1310 (RJL), at 7, 11 (D.D.C. June 22, 
2009), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/janko_
unclassified_release_order.pdf.
249 Al-Adahi v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK), at 41 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Al-Adahi-opinion-
8-21-09.pdf.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 40–41.
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prets the scope of IHL here can have serious ramifications for IHL and 
“warfighting” beyond internment.
Analogy limited to the Third Geneva Convention can be attributed 
in part to the AUMF, which through its authorization of military force 
creates an inherent nexus to combat operations. The Government may cer-
tainly choose not to exercise its full authority under IHL and thus decide to 
intern only “combatants” even if the Fourth Geneva Convention applicable 
to civilians provides a broader internment standard. However, if the Gov-
ernment wishes to comply with IHL, it cannot also extend the definition of 
“combatant” beyond that provided in IHL. To some extent, the AUMF’s 
expansive language opened the door to this inappropriate stretching of the 
IHL standards. The D.C. District Court, however, has thus far reined in the 
Administration’s standards in a manner more consistent with the definition 
of “combatant” as understood under IHL. 
The D.C. District Court has, as of this writing, only ruled upon few 
of the numerous habeas petitions filed. While some of the factors that the 
judges determined established “combatancy” raise concern of being beyond 
the scope of factors acceptable under IHL, the variation in evidence as well 
as much of it being classified makes it difficult to review and compare the 
judges’ decisions. Additional decisions will, of course, further illuminate 
the extent to which the court’s application is consistent with IHL. More 
particularly, how the court’s various interpretations of the current 
internment standard—provided by the Obama Administration—will be 
reconciled also remains to be seen, as no court of appeals has yet clarified a 
standard.251
251 One appeals court tried to do so. See Al Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 
2008), cited in Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2009).
